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Landlord Liability for Criminal Acts
Perpetrated Against Tenants: The
Pennsylvania Approach
I. Introduction
In the past few decades the landlord/tenant legal relationship
has altered substantially. One of the most profound developments
has occurred in the area of landlord liability for criminal acts com-
mitted upon tenants.' Traditionally, a landlord could not be held
civilly liable to his tenants for injuries inflicted by the criminal acts
of third parties, regardless of the deficiency of the security measures
the landlord provided. 2 In recent years, however, the courts have in-
creasingly imposed liability on landlords who fail to take reasonable
steps to protect tenants from criminal activity. 8 The courts have de-
veloped various legal theories upon which to base a duty on the part
of the landlord. The judiciary has utilized statutory, 4 contract, and
tort6 principles to impose liability upon the landlord. In most cases in
which landlords have been found liable for tenants' injuries resulting
from criminal attacks by third parties, liability has been based on
principles of negligence law, namely that a landlord must exercise
reasonable care to protect tenants against foreseeable criminal acts.
7
Pennsylvania, while allowing tenant recovery in limited circum-
stances, 8 has declined to follow the recent trend of expanding liabil-
ity based upon negligence principles. In Feld v. Merriam,9 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court expressly held that a landlord is under no
general duty to protect tenants against criminal intrusion.' 0
1. See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
2. Moore, The Landlord's Liability to His Tenants for Injuries Criminally Inflicted by
Third Persons, 17 AKRON L. REv. 395 (1984).
3. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast, 75 Cal. App.3d 798, 805,
142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 489 (1977).
4. See, e.g., Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975);
Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 66 Misc.2d 276, 322 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
5. See, e.g., Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments Inc., 382 So.2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
6. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
7. 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 234 (Rohan ed. 1986).
8. Pennsylvania does recognize that the landlord may incur a duty to protect if the land-
lord voluntarily or by contract agrees to perform such a duty.
9. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
10. Id. at 393, 485 A.2d at 747.
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This comment explores the historical context of the issues in-
volved in imposing liability upon landlords for criminal acts commit-
ted against tenants. It discusses why the judiciary had traditionally
been reluctant to impose liability on a landlord and then examines
the various concepts that courts have developed to find liability. Fi-
nally, the comment analyzes the reasoning and policy justifications
for the court's decision in Feld, concluding that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did not fully and fairly balance the relative interests
at stake.
II. The Judiciary's Reluctance to Impose Liability Upon the
Landlord
A. The Historical View of the Lease as a Conveyance
Early property law viewed the lease transaction as a conveyance
of land for a term. The focal interest in the conveyance was the
land," and any shelters or structures existing on the land were inci-
dental concerns. 12 The rent was viewed as coming from out of the
land itself, not from the dwelling or the dweller. 13 Viewed as a pur-
chaser of real property, the lessee was subject to the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor," and took the premises "as is." The tenants' only
means of protecting themselves were to inspect the premises before
taking possession or to extract express warranties from the land-
lord. 15 Landlords and tenants were deemed to hold equal bargaining
power in negotiating the lease, and the agrarian tenant was deemed
able to inspect any dwellings adequately and make any necessary
repairs.' The landlord had no duty to repair. Such a characteriza-
tion of the lease served to protect the landlord from liability for inju-
ries proximately caused by defects or dangerous conditions on the
leased premises.' 7 Under such a view, it was not unreasonable to
place upon the tenant the responsibility of providing for his own se-
11. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 7, at 11 234.
12. Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 282, 405 A.2d 897, 902 (1979).
13. Id. at 279-84, 405 A.2d at 900-03.
14. See 2 R. POWELL, supra note 7, at 260.3A. The concept of caveat emptor shaped
the background of the law concerning repairs to leased premises as between the lessor and
lessee. The lessor had no obligation to put the premises in repair at the commencement of the
term, and no obligation to make any repairs during the term's continuance or pay for those
made by the lessee. Even the common law, however, recognized exceptions to the caveat
emptor rule for short term leases of furnished dwellings, leases of buildings under construction,
and in cases where the landlord fraudulently misrepresented or concealed the condition of the
property. Id. See also I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 1 3.45, 3.78 (1952).
15. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 279-84, 405 A.2d at 900-03.
16. Id.
17. 2 R, POWELL, supra note 7, at 234.
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curity.18 "Being viewed as a grantee (although for a limited period),
the tenant was expected to be fully responsible for the maintenance
of the rented property, and this responsibility extended to the provi-
sion of measures necessary to ensure his self-protection."19
B. Absence of a Duty to Protect
In order to maintain a cause of action in tort, a breach of some
duty must be established. Ordinarily, an individual has no duty to
protect another from criminal acts of third parties absent some spe-
cial relationship. Section 314(A) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts20 lists examples of such special relationships. Included among
the sets of relationships establishing a duty to protect are: a common
carrier and a passenger;21 an innkeeper and his guest;2 2 a possessor
of land who holds it open to the public and the members of the pub-
lic who enter upon the land pursuant to the invitation;23 and one who
takes voluntarily, or is legally required to take, custody of another
under circumstances that deprive the other of his normal opportuni-
ties for protection. 4
Many courts have denied recovery to the tenant on the ground
that the landlord had no duty to protect, because the landlord/ten-
ant relationship was not of the special type requiring such a duty.
For example, in Tryce v. Chicago Housing Authority,2 a tenant was
fatally struck by a television set that had been thrown over a railing.
The court declined to find liability on the part of the landlord despite
the fact that the landlord was aware of previous similar incidents
18. Moore, supra note 2, at 395.
19. Id.
20. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 315 (1934). This section provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing bodily harm to another unless,
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or,
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right to protection.
21. See Kenny v. S.E.P.T.A., 581 F.2d 351 (3rd Cir. 1978); Carswell v. S.E.P.T.A., 259
Pa. Super. 167, 393 A.2d 770 (1978).
22. See Buck v. Hankin, 217 Pa. Super. 262, 269 A.2d 344 (1970).
23. See Moran v. Valley Forge Drive-In Theaters, 431 Pa. 432, 246 A.2d 875 (1968).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320, Comment (a) (1965), provides:
The rule stated in this section is applicable to a sheriff or peace officer, a
jailer or warden of a penal institution, officials in charge of a state asylum or
hospital for the criminally insane, or to teachers or other persons in charge of a
public school. It is also applicable to persons conducting a private hospital or
asylum, a private school, and to lessees of convict labor.
25. 14 Ill. App.3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973).
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when various items had been thrown over railings.2 The court main-
tained that the landlord was under no duty to specially design its
building to protect its tenants from criminally reckless acts of third
persons.27 A similar result was reached in Cross v. Chicago Housing
Authority.a8 In that case, the tenant brought a personal injury action
against the Housing Authority after being attacked on the premises.
The court again declined to find any duty to protect on the part of
the landlord. The court stated: "plaintiffs have not alleged a special
relationship between defendant CHA and the plaintiffs which would
impose upon the defendant a duty to control the conduct of third
persons to such a degree as to prevent them from causing the plain-
tiff physical harm.'"29
C. Lack of Causation
In order to make out a prima facie case against the landlord in
tort, the tenant must also demonstrate that the conduct of the land-
lord proximately caused the injury he sustained. As provided in sec-
tion 448 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort
or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting
therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situ-
ation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to com-
mit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his neg-
ligent conduct should have realized the likelihood that such a
situation might be created thereby and that a third person might
avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or
crime. 0
Many courts have utilized this doctrine to absolve the landlord
of liability by maintaining that criminal conduct on the part of a
26. Id. at 99, 302 N.E.2d 209.
27. Id.
28. 74 III. App.3d 921, 393 N.E.2d 580 (1979). See also McCappin v. Park Capitol
Corp., 42 N.J. Super. 169, 126 A.2d 51 (1956); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207
S.E.2d 841 (1974); Ramsey v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. App. 1969); Scott v. Watson,
278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
29. 74 Ill. App.3d at 927, 393 N.E.2d at 585.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). Comment (a) to section 448
provides:
The rule stated in this section applies when the actor's conduct creates a
situation which is utilized by a third person to intentionally inflict harm upon
another or provides a temptation thereto to which the third person yields, the
actor having no reason to expect that the third person would so act. Under the
rule in this section, the actor is not responsible for the harm thus inflicted merely
because the situation which his negligence has created has afforded an opportu-
nity or temptation for the infliction.
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third person is an intervening superseding cause.
In Tirado v. Lubarsky3' the court found that a landlord was
under no duty to anticipate the criminal act of a third person, even
though the landlord's failure to repair the front door lock on the ten-
ant's apartment was arguably the proximate cause of the assault on
the tenant." The court's reasoning revolved around the finding that
such criminal activity is an intervening superseding cause.33
Similarly, in Gulf Reston Inc. v. Rogers, 4 the court held that
the landlord was under no duty to protect the tenant from the inten-
tional criminal act of an unknown trespasser who threw aluminum
paint on the tenant, even though criminal acts had occurred previ-
ously on the premises. The court stated that its finding was appropri-
ate in light of the non-serious nature of the activities engaged in by
previous trespassers; such as redirecting the roof lights of the apart-
ment complex, diving off the roof into a lake, throwing bags of
water, and putting a hole in the roof.3 5 The court maintained that,
under such circumstances, the criminal act of throwing the paint was
not reasonably foreseeable by the landlord, and thus constituted an
independent superseding cause of the injuries sustained by the
tenant.36
D. Public Policy Concerns
In Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark,37 the Supreme
31. 49 Misc.2d 543, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Civ. Ct. 1966), agfd, 52 Misc.2d 527, 276
N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Term 1966).
32. Note, Recent Development, Expanding the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Hab-
itability: A Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants From Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33
VAND. L. REv. 1493, 1504 (1980) [hereinafter Recent Development].
33. The court stated:
Under ordinary circumstances no one is chargeable with damages because
he has not anticipated a crime by some third party. To be actionable the negli-
gence complained of must not only involve the breach of some legal duty which
the defendant owes to the plaintiff, but it must also proximately result in the
injury claimed by the plaintiff.
Tirado, 49 Misc.2d at -, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 56. See also Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d
188 (Tenn. 1975); Dwyer v. Erie Investment Co., 138 N.J. Super. 93, 350 A.2d 268 (1975);
Knapp v. Wilson, 535 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
34. 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974).
35. Id. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845.
36. Id. Accord Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 71 Misc.2d 384, 336 N.Y.S.2d 104, rev'g 66
Misc.2d 276, 322 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Civ. Ct. 1972). In that case, plaintiff/tenant lived on the
second floor of a five story apartment building. Her bedroom window fronted the platform of a
fire escape which led from the roof to the ground. Plaintiff was raped by an intruder. Two
weeks prior to the incident, a piece of glass was cut from the plaintiffs bedroom window
adjacent to the window latch. She made numerous demands to the landlord for repair, but to
no avail. The judgment for plaintiff was reversed for lack of proof that the landlord's negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the tenant's injuries.
37. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
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Court of New Jersey focused upon the policy implications that ac-
company imposition of liability upon landlords. In that case, the
plaintiff, while delivering milk to a tenant at defendant's housing
project, was beaten and robbed.3 8 Addressing whether the defendant
had a duty to furnish police protection, the court noted: "the ques-
tion is one of fairness in the light of the nature of the relationship,
the nature of the hazard, and the impact of such a duty on the pub-
lic interest."8 9 Stating that the duty to provide police protection is
foreign to the history of the landlord/tenant relationship, the court
listed a number of reasons why such a duty should not be imposed.
First, the court reasoned that an owner of property should not
be liable for failing to furnish police protection to deter invading
criminals unless it is also found that he has the right to provide a
police force to that end.40 Maintaining that police protection is the
proper function of the state, the court noted that, "the police func-
tion is highly specialized, involving skills and training which govern-
ment alone can provide."'4" The court maintained that the task of
preventing crime should be borne by the government. "The proper
approach is to state, if there be any doubt upon the subject, the duty
of the constituted police forces to move wherever they need to go, not
only to detect crime but also to prevent it.'
42
The court next considered the inevitable vagueness of placing
such a duty upon the landlord. The court contended that the dictates
of fairness require that an individual be able to determine in advance
of a jury's verdict what his duty is, and whether he had adequately
performed that duty.' 3 In addressing the inherent uncertainty of im-
posing such a duty, the court stated:
To which multi-family houses would the duty apply?
Would it depend upon the number of tenancies? If so, can we
now fix the number? And if the duty springs from a combina-
38. Id. at 579, 186 A.2d at 291. The attack occurred at about 1:30 p.m. in a self-service
passenger elevator. Whether the assailants were tenants, guests of tenants, or intruders, was
not known. The housing project involved covered 19.15 acres, with 10 apartment houses, each
of 12 stories, offering accommodations for 1458 families. The residents at the time numbered
between 5300 and 6000. Id. at 580, 186 A.2d at 292.
39. Id. at 588, 186 A.2d at 296. The appellate division held that the Housing Authority
was under a duty to provide police protection. "Since [defendant] created and maintained a
housing project which, because of its size was beyond the pale of the regular municipal police
surveillance, and yet because of these same factors was susceptible to criminal activities, de-
fendant was under a duty to provide such police protection." Id. at 580, 186 A.2d at 292.
40. Id. at 588, 186 A.2d at 296.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 589, 186 A.2d at 297.
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tion of tenancies and prior unlawful events, what kind of of-
fenses will suffice, and in what number, and will crimes next
door or around the corner or in the neighborhood, raise the obli-
gation? And if a prescient owner concludes the duty is his, what
measures will discharge it? It is an easy matter to know whether
a stairway is defective and what repairs will put it in order...
but how can one know what measures will protect against the
thug, the narcotic addict, the degenerate, the psychopath, and
the psychotic? Must the owner prevent all crime?"
The court determined that it would be unfair to impose such an
imprecise duty upon the landlord.
Furthermore, not only would there be uncertainty as to when
the duty to provide security arises, and as to what devices are neces-
sary to satisfy that duty, but there would also be "exceptional uncer-
tainty with respect to the issue of causation."'4" The court felt it
would involve somewhat of a guessing game to determine whether
some unknown perpetrator of unknowable character and mentality
would have been deterred if the owner had furnished some or addi-
tional security measures." The court contended that because of the
extraordinary speculation inherent in deterring individuals who are
committed to criminal conduct, the "question of proximate cause is
bound to be of exceptional difficulty.
'47
Finally, the court reasoned that the cost of imposing such a duty
upon the landlord would be borne by those individuals least able to
afford it. The court stated,
We are not dealing with a risk that can be passed along in
an increase in liability insurance premiums . . . . The bill will
be paid not by the owner, but by the tenants. And if, as we
apprehend, the incidence of crime is greatest in the areas in
which the poor must live, they, and they alone, will be singled
out to pay for their own police protection.48
44. Id. The court further maintained:
We assume that advocates of liability do not intend an absolute obligation
to prevent all crime, but rather have in mind some unarticulated level of effec-
tiveness short of that goal. Whatever may be that degree of safety, is there any
standard of performance to which the owner may look for guidance? We know
of none.
Id. See also 7735 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App.3d 901, 172
Cal. Rptr. 528 (1981); Smith v. Chicago Housing Authority, 36 Ill. App.3d 967, 344 N.E.2d
536 (1976).
45. 38 N.J. at 589, 186 A.2d at 297.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 591, 186 A.2d at 298. Some courts have maintained that the issue of landlord
liability for criminal acts of third parties against tenants is a matter of policy best left to the
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Not only would imposition of such a duty have a tremendous
economic effect upon the tenant, but also upon the urban housing
market. Landlords who are subject to rent ceilings and who already
operate at low profit margins may not be able to keep up with the
increased costs of security. Consequently, they may abandon their
buildings and accelerate the urban housing shortage. 9
III. Finding Liability
In recent years, courts have become increasingly willing to find
a residential landlord liable for injuries resulting from the criminal
acts of third parties. The courts have based liability on negligence
principles, including negligence as evidenced by breach of a statutory
duty to provide security for tenants, implied or express contracts,
and breach of an implied warranty of habitability."0
A. Negligence Principles
The most important development in the movement to abrogate
the doctrine of landlord immunity has been recognition of the land-
lord's duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his tenants against
foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.5 1 In Kline v. 1500 Massa-
chusetts Ave. Apt. Corp.,52 the plaintiff sustained serious injuries
when she was criminally assaulted and robbed by an intruder in the
common hallway of her apartment building.5" At the time the plain-
tiff signed the lease her landlord was providing various security mea-
sures.' 4 At the time the plaintiff was attacked, however, the landlord
had substantially decreased security, despite his knowledge of in-
creasing criminal activity in the common areas of the apartment
building.55 The court based its finding of liability on both tort and
contract theories; however, the primary rationale for its decision
seemed to lie in tort.56 Reasoning that the landlord's liability grew
legislature. See Hall v. Fraknoi, 69 Misc.2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Civ. Ct. 1972); Trice v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 14 Ill. App.3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973). Since imposing upon
landlords a responsibility for tenant protection could have a significant impact on the cost and
availability of rental housing, it would be more appropriate to allow such a major legal devel-
opment to await legislative action. Moore, supra note 2, at 402.
49. Recent Development, supra note 32, at 1519.
50. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 7, at 234.
51. Recent Development, supra note 32, at 1504.
52. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
53. Id. at 479.
54. id.
55. Id. at 480.
56. Another basis for the Kline holding was grounded in the progressive deterioration of
services in the plaintiff's apartment building. In the court's view there is implied in the con-
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out of the logic of the situation, the court maintained that as be-
tween the tenant and the landlord, the landlord was the only one in
the position to provide necessary measures of security.57 Because it is
the landlord's duty to maintain common areas in reasonably safe
condition, and because the landlord retains exclusive control over the
common areas, the court concluded that the landlord had a duty to
provide protection to tenants from criminal acts perpetrated in those
areas. 58 The court stated:
[Wihere, as here, the landlord has notice of repeated crimi-
nal assaults and robberies, has notice that these crimes occurred
in the portion of the premises exclusively within his control, has
every reason to expect like crimes to happen again, and has the
exclusive power to take preventative action, it does not seem un-
fair to place upon the landlord a duty to take those steps to min-
imize the predictable risk to his tenants.5
The court went on to delineate the scope of the duty as a stan-
dard of reasonable care under all the circumstances.10 The court
noted that the particular security measures necessary to achieve this
standard of care would vary with each individual situation, and that
it would be impossible to describe them in detail for every situation.
Furthermore, evidence of custom among landlords of the same class
of building may play a significant role in determining if the standard
has been met.6'
The court specifically refuted the public policy concerns voiced
in Goldberg.2 Regarding the vagueness of such a duty, the court
stated that "the court [in Goldberg] was using the word foreseeable
interchangeably with the word possible. It would be folly to impose
tract between the landlord and tenant an obligation on the part of the landlord to provide those
protective measures that are within his reasonable capacity. The court held that in view of the
fact that the plaintiff continued to pay the same rent, there was an implied contract to main-
tain security at the level existing at the start of the tenancy. Id. at 485.
57. Id. at 481. The court noted:
As a general rule, a private person does not have a duty to protect another
from a criminal attack by a third person .... But the rationale of this very
broad general rule falters when it is applied to the conditions of modern day
urban apartment living, particularly in the circumstances of this case.
Id.
58. Id. at 485. The court noted, "We recognize that the obligations to which landlords
are held may well increase as the individual tenant's control over his own safety on the land-
lord's premises decreases; conversely as the tenant's control over his own safety increases, the
landlord's obligation should decrease." Id.
59. Id. at 486.
60. Id. at 485.
61. Id. at 486.
62. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
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liability for mere possibilities . . . . But we reach the question of
liability for attacks which are foreseeable in the sense that they are
probable and predictable."' 83 The court in Kline acknowledged the
increased costs that would accompany imposition of such a duty, and
fully recognized that such costs would eventually be passed on to the
tenants, but the court declined to view such considerations as viable
reasons for not imposing that duty. The court stated, "This prospect,
in itself, however, is no deterrent to our acknowledging . . . the
duty, since without protection the tenant already pays in losses from
theft, physical assault and increased insurance premiums. '"64
Since Kline, a number of courts have utilized the tort duty to
protect tenants against foreseeable criminal acts in order to impose
liability on the landlord. In O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp.,65
the plaintiff was raped in her apartment. Previously, several other
tenants had been raped in the same apartment complex. The land-
lord knew of the crimes, was aware of the conditions indicating a
likelihood that the rapist would repeat his attacks, and had been sup-
plied with composite drawings of the suspect and a general descrip-
tion of his modus operandi. 66 The landlord, despite such knowledge,
failed to warn the plaintiff at the time she signed the lease, and even
assured her that the premises were safe and patrolled at all times by
professional guards (none of which was true). 67 Maintaining that the
existence of the most important factor, foreseeability, was alleged,
the court held that the plaintiff had stated a viable cause of action in
negligence, and thereby reversed the demurrer previously sustained
by the trial court." The court stated that the landlord is in a position
to secure common areas, and as a result, he has a duty to protect
against types of crimes of which he has notice and which are likely
to recur if the common areas are not secure. 69
Utilizing sections 302B, 448 and 449 of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts 7 0 the court applied the concept of foreseeability not
63. Kline, 439 F.2d at 483.
64. Id. at 488. The court noted:
The landlord is entirely justified in passing on the cost of increased protec-
tive measures to his tenants, but the rationale of compelling the landlord to do it
in the first place is that he is the only one who is in a position to take the
necessary measures for overall protection of the premises, which he owns in
whole and rents in part to the tenants.
Id.
65. 75 Cal. App.3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
66. Id. at 802, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
69. Id. at -, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965), provides, "An act or omission
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only to establish a duty on the part of the landlord, but also to over-
come the problem of causation and the notion that the criminal acts
of third parties are an intervening superseding cause.7 "If the likeli-
hood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the haz-
ard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an
act whether innocent or criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for the harm caused thereby. '7 2 The court concluded
that the risk of sexual assault was the hazard which made the land-
lord's conduct negligent.73 "By not acting affirmatively to protect ap-
pellant, either by warning her or by providing adequate security, the
landlord increased the likelihood that the plaintiff would become a
victim."
74
B. Statutory Basis of Liability
Some courts have utilized the fact that the landlord breached a
statutory duty in order to find a landlord liable for negligence. In
Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp.," the plaintiffs sued for losses
sustained when their apartment was burglarized. On the day the
plaintiffs moved in, they noticed that the deadbolt lock on the door
of their apartment was not working properly.76 They notified the
landlord of the defective lock on several occasions and were told the
situation would be remedied. No action was taken by the landlord to
repair the lock until two days after the robbery. 77 In affirming a
judgment for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of New Jersey main-
may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to another through the conduct of . . .a third person which is intended to cause harm,
even though such conduct is criminal."
71. Section 448 of the Restatement provides that the criminal act of a third person is a
superseding cause unless, "the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should
have realized the likelihood that his conduct created an opportunity for the crime's commis-
sion, and that a third person might take advantage of that opportunity." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
73. 75 Cal. App.3d at 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
74. Id. at 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Compare Ten Associates v. McCutchen, 398
So.2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), where the court noted, "A landlord . . . generally has
no duty to protect his tenants against criminal activity. There is, however, a growing recogni-
tion in Florida that a landlord's duty of reasonable care may include the duty to protect a
tenant from the results of reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct." 398 So.2d at 861.
75. 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
76. Id. at 371, 346 A.2d at 77. At the time of the break-in the Commission had promul-
gated regulation N.J.A.C. 5:10-6.6(d)(7) (also published in: Regulations for the Construction
and Maintenance of Hotels and Multiple Dwellings, Article 605-3(f)(2)(ii)), providing as fol-
lows: "Doors to dwelling units shall be equipped with a heavy duty lock set equipped with
stopwork for control of the knob and an additional deadbolt or auxiliary latch bolt to prevent
manipulation by means other than a key."
77. Braitman, 68 N.J. at 371, 346 A.2d at 77.
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tained that the landlord's failure to supply the tenants with a work-
ing deadbolt lock was a violation of a penal statute.78 The court
stated that although not conclusive of negligence, the violation of a
statutory duty of care is a circumstance which the trier of fact
should consider in assessing liability.79 The court concluded:
Since the Braitmans are unquestionably among the class for
whose benefit the instant regulations were promulgated, and the
defendant's failure to comply with the regulation was the effi-
cient cause of their loss, . . . plaintiffs would have been entirely
justified in invoking the Multiple Dwelling Law and the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder as evidence of defendant's
negligence.80
C. Implied or Express Contract
Some courts have utilized contract principles to find liability on
the part of the landlord.8 1 In Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp.,82
the landlord of a multiple dwelling had actual knowledge of criminal
activities within the apartment building. In order to combat such ac-
tivity the landlord had been granted permission to increase rents in
the building in order to provide for a protective buzzer system con-
trolling the doors leading to the common hallways." The plaintiff/
78. Id. at 384, 346 A.2d at 85.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 385, 346 A.2d at 86. At the conclusion of the opinion, the majority in
Braitman may have foreshadowed the holding in Trentacost, when the court extended the
implied warranty of habitability to include a duty to provide reasonable protection. "In light of
the growing threat which crime poses to the urban dweller, . . . it may soon be necessary to
impose upon the landlord the contractual duty of taking reasonable precautions to safeguard
his tenants from crimes committed in his apartment buildings." Id.
81. Courts have employed principles of express and implied contract in finding liability.
An express contract is an actual agreement of the parties, the terms of
which are openly uttered or declared at the time of making it, being stated in
distinct and explicit language, either orally or in writing. An implied contract is
one not created or evidenced by the explicit agreement of the parties, but in-
ferred by the law, as a matter of reason and justice from their acts or conduct,
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, making it a reasonable, or even
necessary, assumption that a contract existed between the parties by tacit
understanding.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 292-93 (5th ed. 1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1965), which provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if:
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases his risk of harm, or
(b). the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
82. 47 App. Div.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975).
83. Id. at 135, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
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tenant was assaulted and robbed in the lobby. For a week prior to
the assault the landlord had permitted the protective buzzer system
to fall into a state of disrepair.84
Maintaining that the landlord had voluntarily assumed a duty
of protection for a "monetary consideration, i.e., increased rent, "85
the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's com-
plaint and granted a new trial. The court acknowledged that the
landlord/tenant relationship does not create by implication an obli-
gation on the part of the landlord to provide security, but noted that
the situation is completely different when the landlord, for a consid-
eration, assumes the duty of providing security measures to protect
against the hazard of criminal intruders.8
In Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust,81 a federal
court applying state law held a landlord liable for a tenant's injuries
suffered when she was assaulted and raped by burglars in her apart-
ment. The court maintained that a lease is a contract concerning
reciprocal rights and obligations.8 As a result of this contractual re-
lationship, an implied warranty arises that the landlord will continue
to keep the premises in their beginning condition during the lease.
The evidence produced at trial showed that the hours of a security
patrol had decreased substantially during the course of the tenant's
lease, and thus a breach of the implied contract to maintain condi-
tions had occurred.8 9
D. Implied Warranty of Habitability
Some courts have based landlord liability for the criminal acts
of third parties on breach of an implied warranty of habitability. 90 In
the landmark case of Trentacost v. Brussel,91 a 61-year-old woman
84. Id. at 136, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 241. The landlord himself had removed the lock.
85. Id. at 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
86. Id. at 140, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 244. The landlord had cited Hall v. Fraknoi, 69 Misc.2d
470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1972), as authority for the proposition that the landlord/tenant rela-
tionship does not create by implication an obligation on the part of the landlord to provide
security to tenants against the criminal acts of third parties.
87. 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980).
88. Id. at 1160.
89. Id. For a similar analysis, see Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartments Corp.,
439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
90. See 2 R. POWELL, supra note 7, at 1 225[3]. The concept of habitability came onto
the scene in 1970 in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The D.C. Circuit Court found that all residential leases in the District of Columbia would
contain an implied warranty both that the premises are habitable at the time the tenant takes
possession and that the landlord will continue to maintain and repair the premises throughout
the term of the lease. 428 F.2d at 1081. As of 1986 at least 36 states had legislation creating
warranties of habitability.
91. 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
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was assaulted and robbed in the common stairway of the apartment
building. A padlock secured the back entrance, but there was no lock
on the front door, which both plaintiff and apparently her assailant
had used to enter the premises."3
There was considerable evidence at trial regarding criminal and
other suspicious activity, including burglaries and street muggings in
the vicinity of the plaintiff's residence." Two months before she was
attacked, the plaintiff reported to the landlord an attempt to break
into the building's cellar." At other times she had notified the land-
lord of the presence of unauthorized persons in the hallway."5 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff further maintained that the landlord had previ-
ously promised to install a lock on the front door.' 6 Contending that,
with regard to the modern urban tenant, "the subject matter and
circumstances of the letting indicate that the very object of a land-
lord's undertaking to provide residential premises is to furnish the
tenant with quarters suitable for living purposes,' 97 the court main-
tained that an apartment is not habitable unless it provides a reason-
able measure of security.' 8 The court concluded that the implied
warranty of habitability, imposed upon landlords in the state, ex-
tended to all facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential
purposes. 9 This warranty includes a duty to furnish reasonable safe-
guards to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal activity on the
premises. 100
It is important to note that under the concept of habitability the
landlord's duty to provide protection exists independently of his
knowledge of any risks.101 There is no need to prove notice of an
unsafe condition to establish the landlord's duty. It is enough that
the defendant did not take measures which were in fact reasonable
for maintaining a habitable residence.102 As noted by one commenta-
92. Id. at 218, 412 A.2d at 438.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 219, 412 A.2d at 439.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 226, 412 A.2d at 442. The court was citing language from its decision in
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. at 143-44, 265 A.2d at 533, where it had imposed an implied
warranty of habitability upon the landlord.
98. Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 227, 412 A.2d at 443.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court noted that "Crime ...is an inescapable fact of modern life. Its
presence threatens the suburban enclave as well as the inner city. Tenants universally expect
some effective means of excluding intruders from multiple dwellings; without a minimum of




tor, the court in Trentacost imposed a duty to provide adequate se-
curity based solely upon the landlord/tenant relationship.10 3
IV. The Pennsylvania Approach
Amazingly, the issue of a residential landlord's liability for
criminal acts of third parties did not make its way into the Pennsyl-
vania appellate courts until 1984, in the case of Feld v. Merriam.""
The Felds were tenants in a large apartment complex consisting of
150 acres and 1,000 apartments housed in three high rise buildings.
The apartments were serviced by parking garages adjacent to each
of the apartment buildings. Returning from a social engagement at
about 9:00 p.m., the Felds drove to their allotted space in the park-
ing garage. While parking their car, they were attacked by three
armed felons. At gunpoint they were forced by two of the felons into
the back seat of their car. 1°0 Followed in another car by the third
felon, they were driven past the guard on duty at the gate. When the
assailants threatened to lock Samual Feld in the trunk, Peggy Feld
pled her husband's illness, and to save him, offered herself for her
husband's life. Mrs. Feld was then raped and sodomized by the men
before she was finally released." 6
The landlords provided security services for the entire apart-
ment complex, including trained doormen at the entrances to the
buildings, guards at the two main entrances to the complex, and
guards who patrolled the complex by foot and by car.10 In the three
month period prior to the attack on the Felds, twenty-one separate
incidents of criminal activity were reported on the apartment com-
plex. 10 8 These incidents included a robbery, several burglaries, car
thefts, and an assault on a tenant in a hallway in one of the build-
ings. 1'0 The tenants' association complained to the management
103. Recent Development, supra note 32, at 1515. See also Brownstein v. Edison, 103
Misc.2d 316, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1980), where it was held that the implied warranty of habita-
bility could be the basis for a suit against the executors of a landlord's estate to recover dam-
ages for the wrongful death of a tenant who was robbed and killed in the lobby of an apart-
ment building. See Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App.3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1981); Villalobos v. University of Oregon, 47 Ore. App. 103, 614 P.2d 107 (1980).
104. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
105. 314 Pa. Super. 414, 424, 461 A.2d 225, 229 (1983).
106. Id. at 425, 461 A.2d at 230.
107. Id. at 424, 461 A.2d at 229. Globe Security Systems was also named as a defend-
ant in the instant action. Globe provided security services for the apartment complex under an
oral contract with Cedarbrook. The jury found that Globe had not been negligent in failing to
stop the assailants as they entered and left the apartment grounds, or in failing to discover
their presence in the garage. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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about these incidents and requested that additional security be pro-
vided. 110 The landlords refused to implement any of the proposed
security measures."'
Following a jury trial a verdict was rendered in favor of the
Felds. Peggy Feld was awarded two million dollars and Samual one
million dollars in compensatory damages." 2 Each received one and
one-half million dollars in punitive damages." 3 On appeal, the jury
verdict was upheld."' Viewing the modern residential lease as a con-
tract between the landlord and tenant consisting of mutual rights
and duties, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that, "[fun all ar-
eas of the leasehold, particularly in the areas under his control, the
landlord is under a duty to provide adequate security to protect his
tenants from the foreseeable criminal actions of third parties.""15
The superior court maintained that in order to establish a viable
cause of action a plaintiff must present evidence showing that the
landlord had notice of criminal activity which posed a risk to te-
nants; show that the landlord had the means available to protect
against that risk; and show that the failure to do so was the proxi-
mate cause of the tenant's injuries."" The conduct of the landlord
must be evaluated in light of the facts of each case."' The custom
among landlords of buildings of the same class, and the standard of
protection employed at the commencement of the lease are relevant,
stated the court, in determining the reasonableness of a landlord's
action.118
On further appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the deci-
sion was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court noted
110. Id. The Tenants' Association made specific recommendations to Cedarbrook re-
garding security at the complex. These recommendations included better lighting in the ga-
rages and the installation of mechanized doors on the garages which could be opened by use of
a key or special card. In addition, the Association recommended that more guards be provided
with more security training. They also suggested that the tenants be provided with decals for
their cars so that the guards could better screen the cars entering and leaving the complex. Id.
at 423, 461 A.2d at 230.
!11. Id. at 423, 461 A.2d at 230.
112. Id. at 422, 461 A.2d at 229.
113. Id. In addition, damages for delay in the amount of $83,835.24 were awarded pur-
suant to Pa.R.C.P. 238. Id.
114. Id. On appeal the superior court affirmed the lower court, with the exception that
the award of punitive damages to Samual Feld was reduced by one half. Id.
115. Id. at 427, 461 A.2d at 231.
116. Id. at 428, 461 A.2d at 232. The court specifically relied upon section 302B of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). See supra note 70.
117. Feld, 314 Pa. Super. at 428, 461 A.2d at 232.
118. Id. The court noted that these are just some of the factors to consider in evaluating
the reasonableness of the landlord's conduct. Regarding custom, the court maintained "What
is usually done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed
by a standard of reasonable prudence whether it is usually complied with or not." Id.
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that the closest analogy to the duty to protect tenants from foresee-
able criminal acts is the duty of owners of land who hold their prop-
erty open to the public for business purposes. 119 Owners of land are
required to take reasonable precaution against that which might be
reasonably anticipated.120 This is so because "one who invites all
may reasonably expect that all might not behave, and bears responsi-
bility for injury that follows the absence of reasonable precaution
against that common expectation.' 2' The court concluded that the
landlord-tenant situation was distinguishable from the business situ-
ation in that the common areas of an apartment complex are not
open to the public, nor is the general public expected or invited to
gather there for purposes other than to visit tenants. 2 The court
stated, "An apartment building is not a place of public resort where
one who profits from the very public it invites must bear what losses
that public may create."' 2 s
The Superior Court in Feld had extrapolated the landlord's
duty to protect against foreseeable criminal conduct from the land-
lord's duty to maintain the common areas free from risk of harm
caused by physical defects. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
jected this argument. The court maintained that there is a crucial
distinction between the risk of injury from a physical defect in the
property, and the risk from the criminal act of a third person. 24 In
the former situation, the landlord has effectively perpetrated the risk
of injury by refusing to correct a known and verifiable defect.12 On
the other hand, the risk of injury from the criminal acts of third
persons arises not from the conduct of the landlord but from the
conduct of an unpredictable independent agent.1'2 The court stated:
The criminal can be expected anywhere, any time, and has
been a risk for a long time. He can be expected in the village,
monastery, and the castle keep. To impose a general duty [to
protect tenants against foreseeable criminal acts] would effec-
tively require landlords to be insurers of their tenants safety: a
burden which could never be completely met given the unfortu-
nate realities of modern society.""7
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Although the court found no general duty to protect the tenant
from foreseeable criminal conduct, the court did recognize that lia-
bility might arise in certain narrow circumstances. A landlord may
incur a duty voluntarily or by specific agreement if to attract or keep
tenants he provides a program of security.' 28 When a landlord does
offer such a program he must perform the act in a reasonable man-
ner. 129  The duty is one of reasonable care under the
circumstances:130
A tenant may rely upon a program of protection only
within the reasonable expectations of the program. He cannot
expect that a landlord will defeat all the designs of felony. He
can expect, however, that the program will be reasonably pur-
sued and not fail due to its negligent exercise. A tenant may not
expect more than is offered. If, for instance, one guard is of-
fered, he cannot expect the same quality and type of protection
that two guards would have provided.' s
V. Analysis of the Pennsylvania Standard
As demonstrated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding
in Feld, Pennsylvania has carved out a rather narrow area of liabil-
ity for a landlord with respect to criminal acts perpetrated against
tenants. The question remains whether that position is fair and just
in light of the competing interests.
Pennsylvania's reluctance to adopt the rationale of Trentacost
appears to be justified. The notion of holding a landlord to a duty of
reasonable care regarding criminal acts upon tenants based upon an
implied warranty of habitability has been criticized by many com-
128. Id. The court specifically relied upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sec-
tion 323 (1965), quoted supra, note 81. The court also relied upon Comment (a) of section
323, which provides:
This section applies to any undertaking to render services to another which
the defendant should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things. It applies whether the harm to the other or his things results
from the defendant's negligent conduct in the manner of his performance of the
undertaking, or from his failure to exercise reasonable care to complete it or to
protect the other when he discontinues it.
129. Feld, 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747.
130. Id. The court further noted,
A program of security is not the usual and normal precautions that a rea-
sonable home owner would employ to protect his property. It is an extra precau-
tion, such as personnel specifically charged to patrol and protect the premises.
Personnel charged with such protection may be expected to perform their duties





mentators.3 2 The major criticism of Trentacost is that although the
court imposed a duty upon the landlord to protect his tenants, it
failed to delineate the scope of that duty and the standards to which
a landlord will be held.133 The court in Trentacost maintained that a
landlord's duty is to provide some "reasonable measures of security,"
yet the court did not give the slightest guidance as to what might
constitute "reasonable measures of security." The landlord is left to
guess or anticipate what types of security measures a court or jury
would find reasonable.
Another major criticism of Trentacost is that the court made no
attempt to utilize tort standards of reasonableness and foreseeability
in construing the landlord's duty. Under traditional tort principles a
landlord is duty-bound to protect against only those harms which are
reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. He must protect
against risks of harm of which he has either actual or constructive
notice.1 8 Yet under the holding in Trentacost, the importance of no-
tice and foreseeability as keys to establishing duty, causation, and,
ultimately, liability, is disregarded. The court in Trentacost main-
tained that a landlord's duty to protect his tenants exists indepen-
dently of his knowledge of any risks and the mere fact that the land-
lord failed to provide measures which were reasonable was sufficient
to make out a cause of action. It was these difficulties that prompted
the dissent in Trentacost to maintain that application of the implied
warranty of habitability to the landlord's duty to protect from crime
established what amounted to absolute liability on the landlord
based on his status alone.'3a
Under Trentacost, not only must the landlord extrapolate from
his circumstances what security devices are appropriate based upon
132. See Recent Development, supra note 32, at 1515-20; Moore, supra note 2, at 409-
11; Comment, Landlord and Tenant - Application of Implied Warranty of Habitability Ex-
panded to Encompass Tenant Security, I I SETON HALL L. REV. 576, 584 (1981) [hereinafter
Landlord and Tenant].
133. Recent Development, supra note 32, at 1516.
134. Those risks include the risks of which the landlord knew, or should have known.
Actual notice is defined as notice expressly and actually given, and brought home to the party
directly. The term, however, is generally given a wider meaning as embracing two classes,
express and implied: the former includes all knowledge of a degree above that which depends
upon collateral inference, or which imposes upon the party the further duty of inquiry; the
latter imputes knowledge to the party because he is shown to be conscious of having the means
of knowledge. Constructive notice is information or knowledge of a fact imputed by law to a
person because he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was
such as to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into it. Every person who has actual notice of
circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has con-
structive notice of the fact in all cases in which, by pursing such inquiry, he might have
learned. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 957-58 (5th ed. 1979).
135. 82 N.J. at 231, 412 A.2d at 446-47.
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what risks of which he has notice, he must also affirmatively investi-
gate to find out just what those risks are. This places a harsh burden
upon the landlord, for it places what amounts to strict liability upon
the landlord for criminal acts committed against tenants. Trentacost
almost goes so far as to make the landlord an insurer of his tenant's
safety.
Trentacost has also been criticized on other grounds. Some
commentators and courts have contended that the implied warranty
of habitability analysis should be rejected because the remedies
available under such a warranty are conceptually inconsistent with
the remedies sought in a tort action where a tenant is injured as a
consequence of criminal activity.136 Upon the landlord's breach of an
implied warranty of habitability the tenant may vacate the premises
and terminate the lease; remain in possession and assert the breach
as a defense in an action for unpaid rent; make necessary repairs at
his own expense and deduct the amount from the rent; or pursue
other contract remedies such as specific performance. 137 As noted by
the court in Feld, "nothing even remotely suggests the possibility of
a personal injury claim arising out of an alleged breach of an im-
plied warranty of habitability."' 38
Finally, Trentacost has been criticized on the ground that ex-
panding the implied warranty of habitability to include a duty to
afford tenants security will impose severe economic hardships on the
tenants more so than the landlord. The costs of security will be
passed on to the tenant in the form of increased rent. Because the
incidence of crime is greater in poor urban areas, there is a great
likelihood that the brunt of these costs will be borne by those seg-
ments of the population who are least able to afford it.139 Further-
136. See Recent Development, supra note 32, at 1518-19; Comment, The Landlord's
Emerging Responsibility for Tenant Security, 71 COLUM L. REV. 275, 285 n.80 (1971).
137. See Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 291-95, 405 A.2d 897, 907-08 (1979).
138. Feld, 506 Pa. at -, 485 A.2d at 750 n.2. The court noted,
It would be a gross distortion of the reasoning in Pugh to give it any part in
the analysis of situations such as that presented by the case at bar. Secure doors
and windows, that is, devices which serve the purpose for which they are
designed and which are not merely holes in walls, are fundamental elements in
distinguishing an uninhabitable structure from a residence. Security services are
not. Only the more fainthearted and seclusive could accept the proposition that
lack of such services would render a residence uninhabitable.
Id. at 391, 485 A.2d at 750.
139. See Landlord and Tenant, supra note 132, at 584, where the commentator noted:
The result in Trentacost is flawed in a number of significant respects. The
cost of providing adequate security could be phenomenal in some areas. Further,
it may be questioned why landlords must be forced to bear the burden of crime
which should be properly charged to local government and law enforcement au-
thorities. (footnotes omitted).
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more, the increased costs of security may prompt urban landlords to
sell or abandon their facilities, since such costs may render the oper-
ation unprofitable. This could result in a decrease in the urban hous-
ing stock and acceleration of urban decay. "1 0
The implied warranty of habitability as a source of landlord lia-
bility does not appear to be the appropriate standard. Utilization of
traditional negligence principles, however, could afford the desired
result.141 The harshness of holding a landlord liable under the im-
plied warranty of habitability may well be alleviated by requiring
notice and foreseeability. Requiring a landlord to provide reasonable
protection against risks of crime of which he is aware, or should be
aware, does not seem to be an onerous burden, especially in light of
the fact that the landlord is in control of the premises and has the
singular ability to ameliorate any risks. It is important to note that
under a negligence type of analysis the landlord is not required to
eliminate absolutely the risk of harm from criminal conduct. The
landlord is only required to make some kind of reasonable response
to known and verifiable risks.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a bright line rule
for determining when a residential landlord has a duty to protect
against criminal acts perpetrated against tenants. The landlord ei-
ther voluntarily assumes a duty to protect, or expressly contracts to
provide protection.142 In establishing this rule, the court echoed
many of the public policy concerns originally promulgated in
Goldberg,14 3 including concern over imposing an imprecise standard
of care upon the landlord and requiring a landlord to protect against
risks of harm which are not "known and verifiable.' 4 To require a
Id.
140. Recent Development, supra note 32, at 1519.
141. See Landlord and Tenant, supra note 132, at 584, where the commentator noted,
To some extent the Trentacost court seems to base its departure from tradi-
tional property law on the premise that the present forces of the market place
are not satisfactory to accomplish the purpose of a contemporary residential
lease. An assessment of the court's action, however, raises the issue whether
there was any real need to reconsider the obligations incident to a landlord-
tenant relationship regarding a landlord's duty to protect [against crime]. In the
past, the use of traditional negligence principles and violations of administrative
regulations governing the conditions of multiple dwellings have served to find a
landlord liable to the tenant for crimes committed by third parties under appro-
priate circumstances. Although no one can deny the need for better protection of
tenants, . . . it remains to be seen whether extension of the implied warranty of
habitability will better accomplish that protection or simply place an unneces-
sary and unreasonable burden on the landlord.
142. Feld, 506 Pa. 392, 485 A.2d at 746.
143. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
144. Feld, 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746.
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landlord to protect against the conduct of the criminal would be to
impose a "burden which could never be completely met."'14 In short,
the court's real concern was with protecting the interests of the land-
lord. The court felt that, under the reasoning employed by the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court, the landlord's duty could not be adequately
delineated so as reasonably to limit his liability.
It should be noted, however, that in rejecting the superior
court's rationale, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have argued
from a faulty premise. The court's concurring analysis was based on
the assumption that the superior court had adopted the Trentacost1"
implied warranty of habitability theory. 147 Close scrutiny of the su-
perior court's reasoning reveals no such reliance upon Trentacost.
Under Trentacost, a tenant need not show that the landlord had no-
tice of a particular unsafe condition in order to maintain a cause of
action. It is sufficient if the landlord did not take measures which
were in fact reasonable."' 8 The superior court held that "notice" was
necessary to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the
landlord, 4 9 and predicated its finding of liability upon traditional
negligence principles. Thus, while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
criticisms may adequately refute Trentacost, they do not justify ab-
rogating a negligence/tort theory of liability.
Concededly, the supreme court's concerns with vagueness and
imprecision regarding a landlord's duty are somewhat evident under
a negligence/tort type of analysis. Problems of vagueness, in terms
of what type of conduct the duty requires, may still exist under the
negligence type of analysis. This problem can be effectively elimi-
nated if the state legislature outlines the scope of a landlord's duty
through housing codes which set forth minimum measures of secur-
145. Id. In his concurring opinion Justice Zappala noted,
Courts have struggled with the issue of whether liability may be imposed
upon a landlord for criminal acts. The conflicting resolutions of this issue result
from the court's attempts to respond to what is essentially a social problem,
rather than a landlord-tenant problem. The risk of harm from criminal conduct
is not peculiar to the landlord-tenant relationship. It is a risk that one encounters
in society at large. Any attempt by a landlord to insulate tenants from this risk
must necessarily fail. Therefore, the mere fact that a tenant may be exposed to
that risk cannot be the basis for imposing liability.
485 A.2d at 751.
146. 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 426 (1980).
147. Feld, 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746; "The Appellees urge this Court to hold, as
did the Superior Court, that a landlord owes a duty - to provide security to protect against
criminal acts of third persons - based upon the implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases." Id. at 398, 485 A.2d at 749 (Zappala, J., concurring).
148. Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 227, 412 A.2d at 443.
149. Feld, 314 Pa. Super. at 421, 461 A.2d at 232 (1983).
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ity. Courts can also give substance to the duty by establishing gen-
eral guidelines. The superior court in Feld attempted to provide such
guidance. There the court noted that custom among landlords in
buildings of a similar class, and security measures provided at the
beginning of the lease term are relevant in delineating the scope of
the duty. Furthermore, as the case law develops in this area, prece-
dents and rules will emerge which will provide adequate benchmarks
against which landlords can evaluate their situation. Certainly, in
many circumstances, determining the landlord's duty may be pain-
fully obvious. For example, when a landlord is put on notice that a
tenant's door lock is not working, and the landlord knows that break-
ins have occurred in the apartment building previously, the land-
lord's duty is not difficult to ascertain. Clearly, his duty is to provide
a new lock within a reasonable time.
Making the landlord's duty contingent upon foreseeability and
notice places the landlord in a better position to judge what security
measures a particular situation demands. If a landlord knows what
risks exist, he can more easily determine how such risks may be
dealt with effectively. If the legislature and courts are able to formu-
late guidelines on how to deal with those risks, the problems of im-
precision and vagueness can be even more successfully treated.
Foreseeability and notice requirements also alleviate problems
of uncertainty and vagueness regarding causation. In the example
above, if landlord's failure to fix the lock results in a burglary, the
criminal conduct in such a situation is not an unpredictable, inde-
pendent cause. 5 0 It would not be unfair to maintain that the land-
lord's failure to fix the lock, together with his knowledge of previous
break-ins, caused the tenant's injuries.
Admittedly, as noted in Feld, the criminal "can be expected
anywhere, any time, and has been a risk for a long time."'' To im-
pose upon a landlord an absolute duty to protect against criminal
conduct under all circumstances would be unfair. There are, how-
ever, circumstances where the conduct of the criminal is not a re-
mote possibility, but rather, a predictable risk that could be pre-
vented through implementation of basic security measures. 52 It is
150. Feld, 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746.
151. Id.
152. For example, the fact that there is a possibility of criminal conduct does not neces-
sarily warrant providing a deadbolt lock on a door. However, if that door, in the absence of a
deadbolt lock, has been broken into on previous occasions, and the landlord is put on notice of
that fact, the landlord's failure to provide a deadbolt lock may be a negligent act, especially if
the landlord is in control of the doors and types of locks put on those doors. Furthermore, if
the landlord fails to provide a deadbolt lock and the break-ins continue, it cannot be contended
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these situations which warrant protection.
Certainly the tenant, in order to establish a cause of action,
should be required to show that the criminal conduct bore an ade-
quate causal nexus to the negligent conduct of the landlord. Al-
though it cannot be denied that there may be some problems in de-
ciding what constitutes an adequate causal relationship for purposes
of establishing liability, fairness mandates that the task be under-
taken by our courts.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adoption of its bright line
rule with respect to the landlord's duty to protect against criminal
conduct causes harsh results for the tenant. 53 Under many circum-
stances there are no problems of vagueness. The criminal conduct is
foreseeable. The landlord has knowledge of the risk and the means
available to abate the risk. His duty is clear. His inaction is causally
related to the criminal conduct. Still, he is not subject to liability.
Such unfairness to the tenant is unwarranted. Considerations of
vagueness and uncertainty do not justify complete insulation of the
landlord from liability. Although the supreme court's concern with
protecting the landlord's interests are certainly legitimate, the court
may have gone too far. The bright line rule adopted by the court
eliminates almost all uncertainty regarding what conduct is required
of the landlord. Basically, the landlord must perform only that which
he specifically agrees to perform. The question is, does this rule suffi-
ciently protect the interests of the tenant? Under the bright line rule
the landlord is under no compulsion to provide security. He may opt
to provide no program at all. The decision is his, and his alone. Of
course, market forces and a desire to attract tenants may lead a
landlord to adopt a program of security, but many times such pro-
grams may prove to be inadequate or ineffective because of the fact
that in Pennsylvania the landlord will not be held accountable for
such inadequacy. Under Feld, a tenant may rely upon a program of
security only within the reasonable expectations of the program pro-
vided. Feld does not require that the program be adequate or reason-
that such break-ins were unpredictable.
153. For example, suppose an individual has been assaulting tenants in a certain apart-
ment building. It has been established that, each time, this individual has entered through the
front door of the apartment building. Further suppose that the front door is without a lock,
and that it has never had a lock. The landlord has been put on notice of these assaults, and the
tenants have pleaded with him to place a $15 lock on the door. The landlord refuses and the
assaults continue. Under the rule in Feld, a tenant would have no cause of action against the
landlord, despite the fact that the simple measure of providing the lock may have alleviated
the problem, and despite the fact that the landlord knew that, for all intents and purposes, not
providing the lock would result in continued assaults on tenants.
LANDLORD LIABILITY
able under the circumstances. It mandates only that the program of
security, whatever it may be, must be conducted with reasonable
care. As noted by the court in Feld, "A tenant may not expect more
than is offered.1 154 Protection of a tenant's interests cannot be left to
market forces or a landlord's goodwill. Something more concrete
must be provided to guarantee protection of the tenant. Some objec-
tive standard, by which to evaluate a landlord's conduct should be
established.
The Trentacost rule made liability on the part of the landlord a
virtual certainty, which unduly burdens the landlord. The Feld rule
makes landlord liability an effective impossibility. This is unfair to
the tenant. Some middle ground should be struck. The flexibility
provided by the tort standard of reasonableness under the circum-
stances, guided by notions of notice and foreseeability, appears to be
the only fair way to approach the problem.
V. Conclusion
The bright line rule established by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court simplifies the issue of when a landlord is to be held liable to
his tenants for injuries inflicted by a criminal. There is no uncer-
tainty as to when a duty to protect against criminal conduct arises.
Nor is there uncertainty in terms of what kinds of security measures
must be maintained in order to discharge that duty. The Pennsylva-
nia rule essentially leaves matters regarding a tenant's security to
the discretion of the landlord. He alone decides whether he will as-
sume a duty to protect, and he alone defines the limits of that duty.
In promulgating this rule the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sac-
rificed justice and fairness for certainty. While working to remedy
the injustice of holding a landlord to an imprecise and unattainable
duty, the court seems to have overlooked the interests of the tenant.
In reacting to the analysis of Trentacost, whereby a landlord essen-
tially is an insurer of his tenant's security, the court has substituted
one extreme for another. The Pennsylvania rule fails to account for
those situations when it is appropriate to hold a landlord liable.
Therefore, it does not adequately balance the interests involved.
Utilization of a tort/negligence type of analysis appears to be
the answer to such injustice. Although some degree of uncertainty
necessarily attends adoption of a negligence standard of care, such
uncertainty can be effectively alleviated. With the help of the legisla-
154. Id. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747.
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ture and the courts, the scope of a landlord's duty to protect can be
sufficiently delineated and kept within reasonable bounds. Any re-
maining costs of uncertainty are more than offset by the enhanced
ability to do justice. A negligence standard provides the flexibility
necessary to eliminate the harshness of the "per se" rules established
in Trentacost and Feld. No longer should the tenant be at the mercy
of a landlord's goodwill when the provision of security measures is
concerned. At the same time, the landlord should not be required to
eliminate all crime. With a negligence type of analysis, the unique
interests of landlord and tenant can be weighed and evaluated, and
an appropriate and fair result reached for each individual set of
circumstances.
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